THE ANTINOMY OF FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
AND THE PROBLEM OF MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY/
BY H. M. GORDIN.

known to students of philosophy, the free-will problem,
AS or well
Kant's third antinomy, consists in the following: The law
is

-

of causation

is,

so far as our experience goes, so universal that

it is

exempt human activity from its control.
On the other hand, there are several arguments which, it is claimed,
prove or favor the doctrine that within certain limitations a freeman
is free of the inexorability of this law.
While this subject has been
discussed by numerous writers, I am not familiar with any book or
paper where all the arguments of the libertarians are successfully
answered. Most probably none exists, as otherwise modern erudite
writers, e. g., the author of the article on free will in the Encyclopcsdia Britannica, 11th ed., Vol. XXVIII, p. 654, and the author of
the article on the same subject in the Encyclopccdia of Religion and
Ethics, Vol. VI, pp. 124-127, would not defend the doctrine of libertarianism.
I shall therefore answer the arguments of the libertarians in what I consider a perfectly convincing manner, and show
utterly unreasonable to

that the doctrine of determinism

is

in

accord with facts, while that

or freedom of choice so as

freedom of the will
to agree with facts, when it becomes

identical with determinism.

I

of libertarianism

is

not, unless the latter defines

shall further

show

that determinism

allows the freeman acting within the range of his possibilities

all

the freedom of action and choice he can possibly wish to possess, and
that this

amount of freedom

perfectly inconceivable

Let us

first state

how

is,

it

within this range, so great that

it is

could be greater.

the arguments of the libertarians.

1 The material of this article will be incorporated in a book on Science,
Truth, Religion and Ethics which I am preparing for publication.
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capable of doing the reverse of what he is
imputed to be compelled to do. This may be illustrated by the
1.

The freeman

following example:
in

order to get some

is

libertarian starts to travel east

Suppose that a

He

particular thing.

nothing compels him to go

will,

remind him of the fact that

his going east

of course, claim that

Now,

in that direction.
is

let

a determinist

not free of causation

him
turning
on
by
to go there. The traveler can prove his independence
Since
that.
can
do
his heels, and go west. As a freeman, he certainly
there can be no better proof by which a freeman may prove his
freedom from compulsion than doing the opposite of what he is
because the attraction of the thing he

is

after actually compels

claimed to be compelled to do, the traveler's ability to reverse his
decision ought, it is claimed, to be accepted as conclusive for proving that his acts are free of the restraints of causality.
2.

In his voluntary activity, man,

it

is

asserted,

is

perfectly

unconscious of any force compelling him to act in a particular
manner. If causality regulated his actions he certainly ought to be
conscious of
3.

The

its

power.

doctrine of determinism

is

said to be degrading

and

depressing, converting even a freeman into a slave of an inexorable
law, since he

claimed that,

must do what the
if

latter

compels him to do.

determinism be true,

man

It is

further

cannot have the slightest

influence on the course of events, every event being predetermined

by immutable antecedent causes.
4. If determinism were true, moral responsibility, it is claimed,
would lose its significance, since no one could feel remorse for the
committal of a wrong if he admitted that, owing to causality, he
could not have acted otherwise.

The

libertarian

further asserts

would have no justification for punishing criminals,
improvement
of man's moral character would be imand that the
possible if all human acts were predetermined by immutable causes.
Before answering these arguments, let us examine the nature
of the acts that are involved in the controversy between the libertarians and the determinists.
It is self-evident that acts which are
beyond the ability of the actor to perform and acts which are comthe
mitted unconsciously must be ruled out of our discussion
former he, of course, never commits, and in committing the latter
he cannot be said freely to choose his actions. Another category
of acts that must be excluded are those which are involuntary,
defining by this term acts which are imposed on one by an irresistible power and are condemned by the judgment of the actor, such
as the unwillingly performed acts of a slave. Still another category
that the State

:
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of acts that are not involved in the controversy are those which,
the preceding, are condemned by one's own judgment, and
which are therefore never committed by an intelligent person unless
he is under the influence of intoxicants, or in a fit of overwhelming
like

when his mind is
when he acts under the

passion

in a state of almost

or

influence of irresistible cravings or habits

from which he would

The

like to

complete aberration,

but has no will-power to break away.

and obviously not
commit them being certain peculiarities
in the nervous system of the actor.
Hence even the libertarian
must admit that they are not the results of free choices, but the
inexorable consequence of forces over which the actor has little or
acts of this category, too, are involuntary

causeless, the impulses to

no control.

The only

acts that are involved in the controversy

under

dis-

cussion are therefore those which are voluntary, defining by this

term acts which are not forced on the actor by an external master
or an irresistible craving, passion, or habit, and are approved or at
least not

condemned by

his

own judgment.

It is

these that the liber-

tarian claims are free of the restraints of causation.

and

The next step is to state clearly
to show that it is in accord with

the claim of the determinist,

The claim

facts.

consists in

and that the choices between different voluntary acts are caused by the most approved
and strongest of the desires, though the latter are not intense enough
that voluntary acts are caused

to

be such

The

irresistible

desires involved

by

desires,

cravings as to

may

make

the acts involuntary.

be for the acts themselves or for their

direct

or indirect results, but desires there must be, and,

choice

is

exercised, they

the desires for

any other

to the occasion.

when

must be stronger and more approved than
acts or their results that are appropriate

In accord with this claim,

given act a freeman says,

I

when

in respect to a

hate to but will none the less commit

what he means is that he hates the act but likes its results, and
them more than he likes any other suitable act or its results.
The correctness of this claim is proved by the most reliable
method we have at our disposal, and that is, by interrogating the
it,

likes

Our

actor committing a voluntary act.

traveler, for instance, will

admit that, in accord with the claim of the determinist, he goes
east because he desires a certain thing which he cannot get at home,
that when he reverses his action he does so because the argument
of the determinist created in
fute his opponent

—and

him

a

new

that this desire

desire
is

proved than that for the thing he started out

—the desire

stronger and
to get.

to con-

more ap-

In fact, should
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him of exceptional

vakie, he

admit that he would brush aside his adversary and continue
journey eastward,

telling

the determinist that his desire for

the thing there, while not an irresistible craving,

is

nevertheless so

strong that he would not stop to bother about philosophical antinomies at that moment, and that he would discuss the matter with

some more opportune time. Similarly, the voluntary act of
and ill-smelling medicine is caused by his
desire to improve his health, and this desire obviously is stronger
and more approved than that for taking something pleasant that
might either harm him or do him no good. In the same way, the

him

at

a patient taking bitter

average volunteer

who

is

willing to sacrifice his life in defense of

you that his desire to do his duty to his
country is stronger and more approved than that for staying at
home while his native land is being attacked by a foe, that he
prefers the moral exaltation and the short life of a hero to the despicable and universally reprobated though longer life of a slacker.
So much for the causality of the voluntary acts themselves. As
to desires and the choices between them, they, too, are not causeless,
Thus, his
their causes being in most cases perfectly well known.
desire for going east the traveler will doubtless ascribe to the fact
that the thing there will satisfy certain of his wants, and when he
goes back on his original decision, he will admit that his desire
to refute the claim of the determinist is caused by a feeling of
pride in the correctness of his views on the free-will problem, as
well as by a feeling of contrariness, or combativeness, and that the
combined effect of these feelings is stronger than the feeling creathis

fatherland will

ing in

him the

tell

desire for the thing in the east.

patient for improving his health obviously

is

The
due

desire of the

to his sense of

self-perservation which under ordinary conditions creates exceptionally strong and approved desires for taking and doing things
promoting our well-being, even when they are in themselves disFinally, the desire of the volunteer to do his duty is
agreeable.
the result of his moral sense which in the moral man creates powerful and highly approved desires to be moral.
If desires be pursued still further backward, it will be found

that even the causes of their causes are, at least in

some

cases, well

Thus, the causal series involved in the act of going to
desire for food
feeling
dinner is as follows act of going
in
certain
sensory
nerves
changes
withcertain
hunger
of
of
our
bodies.
That
cells
is
from
the
about
nourishment
holding
as far as we need go, since the terms of the series lying beyond the

known.

:
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withholding of nourishment vary from case to case, and are of
But even when we cannot go as
in our discussion.

no importance

far as in this case, there is no reason for assuming that the series
comes to a stop where we are compelled to stop, because a similar
state of affairs is met with in the examination of every natural
phenomenon without exception. Proceeding backward along the
series of successive causes of any observed occurrence, we necessarily arrive at a term whose antecedents are unknown, but that
does not prove that no antecedents exist. The fact that diligent

research frequently discovers hitherto

unknown

causes justifies the

assumption that the chain of causality is infinite. The only legitimate alternatives to this assumption are that the chain ends in a
property that is as inherent in the last term as it is inherent in

human
it

intelligence that

ends in a causa

prefers.

man

two and two must equal

finalis,

four, or else that

according to whichever assumption one

Thus, the moral sense

may

be as inherent in the moral

as are his feelings of shame, sympathy, regret,

and love of

be due to some antecedent causes. When the freewill problem reaches this point, the determinist has already proved
music, or

may

he claims is that human activity is as subject
world with which we are familiar.
Why our consciousness or mind or ego or soul or whatever be the
name of the human vis vitae interprets changes in our nervous
system as feelings, and why these create desires, are perfectly idle
his thesis, because all

to causality as the rest of the

questions.

Operations of this sort are essential attributes of conis dead or at least unconscious.

scious life; in their absence one

Why

and desires have certain particular forms, i. e., why
so, and not otherwise, is also an idle question, because since they must have some form, one form is, in the absence
of further light on the subject, as reasonable as another. As to
their general uniformity for a given person, this is obviously due to
his general make-up which is to a large extent constant throughout
his life, and in so far as it is not constant, his feelings and desires
really vary with his conditions and advancing age. Still more idle is
the question why our reasoning faculty operates in such a manner as
It must operate according
to approve or condemn certain desires.
logic,
and
must make use of the
human
of
rules
to definite fixed
probability
that, owing to the inthe
of
and
memory of past events
pleasant
or
unpleasant, moral or
certain
exorability of causation,
feelings

they are so and

immoral, consequences are more liable to be the results of certain
actions than certain other consequences. It must therefore work in
a

more or

less definite

manner, and

its

working

in

a certain particu-
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to the

numer-

ous factors constituting one's personality.

That human

activity

is

subject to causaHty

is

further proved by

the fact that, as indicated above, one's acts vary in a
definite
istics,

manner

more or

less

v^ith one's age, sex, nationality, inherited character-

education, surroundings,

of the numerous

A

etc.

complete knowledge of

all

and complex factors influencing the desires of a

given person would doubtless enable a psychologist to read his mind
and foretell his actions under given conditions. To a considerable
extent this ability

really possessed

is

much worldly experience and

by many people having had

thus gained a good "knowledge of

men." This would be perfectly impossible if desires, choices, and
acts were causeless and therefore unpredictable.
Another proof is that when one of the terms in the series of
successive causes of an act is inhibited, all the subsequent terms
drop out. When the feeling of hunger is destroyed by a sudden
shock of fright or bad news the desire for food vanishes, and the
act of going to dinner is stopped. When a moral person who is on
the point of committing an act approved or not

condemned by

his

judgment, hears or reads arguments which prove that under the
given conditions the act would be immoral, his desire for committing it is overcome by a more approved and stronger desire to be
moral, and the act
ously injured,

all

is

not committed.

When

a nerve-center

is

seri-

the feelings, desires, and actions controlled by

it

disappear.

Having shown that all human activity is controlled by causality,
argument of the libertarians is untenable, it is easy
that
the
second argument also is untenable. In his voluntary
show

so that the first
to

activity

man

is

unconscious of any external authority and of irre-

condemned cravings driving him to action because such
authority and such cravings are by definition absent from such
sistible

but he

activity,

desires

is

and of the

fully

conscious of the force of his strongest

logicity of the strongest

arguments approving

them, or of the absence of arguments condemning them. When
hungry we are conscious of a powerful desire for food and of the
if we want to live we must eat, and that
under ordinary conditions we have a moral right to eat. And when
our sound judgment tells us that, owing to our corpulency, it would
be better for us to omit a meal, or that for moral reasons it would

cogent argument that

be preferable to give
arises in

it

to a starving person, there immediately

our consciousness a strong and approved desire to follow

the counsel of our reason, and

we

are again fully conscious of the

THE OPEN COURT.

176

new

desire

conscious

and of the soundness of our judgment.

we

life

desires, moral,

In our daily

are frequently confronted with several conflicting

immoral, and amoral, and with reasoning arguments

advising different choices.

when the voluntar}^ actions
we feel that we are thrown

Particularly

involved are of special importance do

upon our own resources we hesitate, compare, sift, and argue with
making up our minds how to act. During this
interval of time, which sometimes is of considerable duration, we
are fully conscious of an inner struggle for supremacy between
Until
different desires and different processes of argumentation.
we reach a decision we are particularly impressed with our freedom
of choice between different desires because we are in the midst of
a confusion which we may bring to order any way we like, and
because we do not yet know which of our desires and judgments
;

ourselves before

will

come out

victorious.

The

inexorable necessity of following the

is thus hidden because we
do not yet know which is the strongest and worthiest. When,
however, we reach a conclusion and finally decide upon a definite
mode of action, we are perfectly conscious of the fact that our action
corresponds with that desire for it which during the inner fight has
become stronger than the rest and has received the support of the

strongest desire and worthiest motive

best arguments.

At

that

moment we become extremely

conscious

of the necessity of causality because in committing a voluntary
act
it

under these conditions we know full well why we are doing
what we are doing. It is only in performing routine

as well as

work

that a

man

is

not fully conscious of the fact that his acts

are compelled by his desires and judgments, but this

such work meets with no

resistance

is

so because

from within or without.

No-

and the actor feels no strong desires for
It is performed in a mechanical way
refraining from doing it.
The moment, however, some remark,
requiring little attention.
thought or external phenomenon causes him to conceive a desire
for doing something else, he feels the necessity of making a choice,
and when he makes it he feels that his choice is the inexorable result
of his strongest desire and strongest argument. Hence the second
argument of the libertarian is, like the first, contrary to facts.
In order to answer the third argument, let us examine the
nature of the compulsion causality imposes on the freeman. Since
this compulsion amounts to nothing more than that in performing
a voluntary act he must follow his own most approved and strongest
desire which he loves to satisfy anyway, the law of causation is
body interferes with

it,

in this case entirely deprived of its sting of tyranny.

It is

perfectly
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a person' has a strong and approved or at least not

he would commit it with no
dropped into his heart out of
the blue sky without any cause whatsoever, or if he manufactured
it himself es niJiilo.
If a man be asked what sort of freedom of
action he would like to have as far as his possibilities go, he would
certainly want no other variety than freedom to satisfy his strongest,

condemned

desire to

greater zeal even

commit an

act

the desire for

if

it

approved, or at least uncondemned desires without the interference

This degree of freedom determinism allows the voluntarily acting freeman this degree of freedom is all he wants for his voluntary acts, and this degree of freedom is so great that, within the limits of what the freeman can do.
of irresistible undesirable forces.

;

it

is

inconceivable

stance, goes east

how

it

to confute his opponent,

decision

when

could be greater.

when he himself

Our

traveler, for in-

more than

likes the thing there

and he can and does reverse

the claim of his adversary rouses in

his original

him

liking for maintaining the doctrine of his independence.

a stronger

He

cannot
do both things simultaneously he must and, as a rule, likes to do
either one or the other thing, and he actually acts as he likes to act.
As far as the act of going in some particular direction is concerned,
:

there can be no greater freedom of choice than

Hence

freeman.

freeman so much freedom
nothing

To

left

is

possessed by the

the doctrine of determinism bestows
that,

upon the

barring impossibilities, there

is

for the libertarian to give him.

claim, as the libertarian in his third argurrient does, that

in his voluntary activity

of following his

ma» who

is

own

man must

feel

strongest desires

is

depressed by the necessity
as absurd as to claim that a

hungry and freezing, and who does not want

to let

himself starve or freeze to death, but longs for a good meal and a

warm

would feel depressed if his friend picked him up on the
and forcibly placed him in a well-provisioned palatial residence where he may eat and drink and do anything he likes and
bed.

street

Furthermore, since even the strongest desires for voluntary
become overpowering cravings, the
fact that such acts are forced by causality is less burdensome than

can.

acts are not so irresistible as to

the act of the
in the

man

forcibly placing his starving

house of plenty.

Thus,

in

and freezing friend

going east our traveler

is

not

driven by an irresistible craving, since in that case his act would
not be voluntary.
Some particular occurrence or some cogent
argument might create in him a stronger and more approved desire
to go in some other direction, or stay where he is, and determinism
Similarly, the volunteer, who is making
permits him to do that.
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preparations for going to the front in order to do his duty to his
country, usually

is

not driven by the whip of an irresistible craving,

because in that case his act would not be voluntary and would
therefore not be moral at

all,

for an act committed under the in-

any kind is no more moral than
one committed per order of the chief of police. The democratic
volunteer may, for instance, all at once become convinced, rightly
or wrongly, that his country has become an autocratic tyranny
He would then change his
that does not deserve to be defended.
fluence of an irresistible force of

action
If

and stay

man

at

voluntary activity
his

own

home.

has some reason to be dissatisfied

and judgments which have

desires

it

their

but because the range of this sort of activity

would
he

is

like

it

to be,

i.

e.,

own

evils.

is

immutable causes,
not as wide as he

passions or of somebody else's will,

while in some cases his freedom of choice

two

not because his

because his possibilities are limited, since

often the slave of his

the lesser of

is

forced on him by the necessity of following

is

In other words,

is

it

is

limited to choosing

only in respect to

compulsory that man
may feel depressed. The question whether it is prudent and
justifiable for the man of our enlightened age to shed, tears over
what he cannot do instead of enjoying what he can do and has

acts that even the libertarian admits to be

already done,
suffice

I

shall

discuss on another occasion.

to point out that

man's

ability to

Here

it

perform voluntary

may
acts

should be to him a source of great satisfaction, since such acts
imply the possession of a reasoning faculty which is far superior
to that of every
zation.

A

known

creature,

and

to

being devoid of this faculty

which he owes
is

his civili-

incapable of voluntary

being committed without deliberation, as direct
immediate impulses. The educated freeman should
therefore not feel depressed and degraded but delighted by, and
proud of, his ability and necessity to hesitate and deliberate and
approve before acting. Our feelings, like our children, frequently
bring us sorrow as well as joy; our reasoning faculty is our best
It is not the causality of our
friend and most reliable guardian.
phenomena and our own
the
physical
of
voluntary activity, but that
trouble
and may therefore
bring
in
us
carelessness that sometimes
man
hurt by falling
When
gets
a
cause a depression of our spirits.
with
his
carelessness
and
out of a window, he may feel dissatisfied
the law of gravity, but when he voluntarily constructs a chute and
slides down in order to escape from fire, he is mighty glad that this
activity, all his acts

results of his

same law enables him

to save his life

by carrying out

his voluntary
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approved desire prompts him to carry

his reasoning faculty enables

As

him

it

to construct such

to influencing the course of events,

is

it
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out,

and that

an appliance.

a fact that

man

does have strong desires to improve himself and the conditions

on

and that nature does not interfere in his
She even allows him to pit
them against each other any way he likes, thus letting herself be
subdued to his needs. In the course of his evolution, man's desires
have multiplied, and just because he is compelled to find ways and
means for satisfying them he has changed and is constantly changing
the face of the earth and the institutions of society.
This is an
undeniable fact, and whether one believes in libertarianism or deof

life

his little planet,

activity as long as

terminism,
It

is

it

is

he obeys her laws.

a cheerful fact.

true that the law of causation

including those in which

man

makes

all

future events,

takes part, predetermined by the past

and the present, so that a being knowing all the causes which have
operated and are operating in the world could foretell the course
of all events to come. But such a being would also know that the
human race is an integral part of the world, and that in following our
desires and judgments we are influencing the course of events in
accord with the law of causation.

This again

is

the scheme of the constantly changing world.

would
desires
acts

a fact, a part of

What

difference

make to us if some being knew beforehand what sorts
we and our successors were going to have, what kinds

it

we and

of
of

they will be compelled by causality to perform, and

what part our activity will play in shaping historical events? A
mother usually knows what her child will want on opening its eyes
in the morning, but that does not prevent the child from actually
shaping her actions by demanding and getting what it wants, and
from enjoying the feeling that it is the pet and lord of the household.

I

know

that

my

neighbor,

who

is

very fond of music,

is

Does my knowledge encroach upon his freedom of action? Moreover, even if man himself
had a complete knowledge of the future he would not lose his
freedom of action and choice because he would then have strong
desires to mould his activity accordingly. That this is so is proved
by the fact that we feel and enjoy our freedom and deliberately
follow our approved desires even when we have known to a cerWe plan our theater parties
tainty what they were going to be.
days or weeks ahead, the details of our vacations months ahead,
and the careers of our children years ahead, and at the time of
realizing our plans we enjoy them in perfect freedom and with
going to attend the opera next season.
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as

much

In fact,

delight as

if

they were created on the spur of the moment.

we Hke nothing

better than that our plans should not, on

account of some outside interference, miscarry, though

we know

that they have been determined long ago.

follows from our discussion that there

It

contradiction between freedom and necessity.

dom from

is

not the slightest

Freedom means

free-

external powers and disapproved irresistible cravings,

which characterizes voluntary

and gives the freeman the opwishes and judgments. In
this respect the freeman has freedom of choice.
Necessity, on the
other hand, means that voluntary acts are the immutable results
of the most approved and strongest desires.
In this respect man
acts

portunity to act according to his

is

in

The

compelled to choose.
that

realize

it

his

is

own

inexorability of this necessity consists

perfectly inconceivable

voluntary

He

acts.

why

loves to

within his power to commit them, and his

—his

own

reason

committal.

Why,

commit them?

—approves
in the

or at least

name

of

common

Kant's third antinomy

without foundation in

a freeman should not
commit such acts, it is
best friend and guardian
does not condemn their

is

sense, should

he not

therefore a pure fiction

reality.

Before answering the fourth argument of the libertarians,

let

meaning of their claims. If the doctrine of
libertarianism claims for the freeman nothing more than freedom
to act according to his own desires and judgments which, as shown
us inquire into the

above, are subject to causality,
If this doctrine claims that

it

is

identical

with determinism.

voluntary acts are free of the restraints

of causality, it is contrary to facts. Moreover, this sort of freedom
most probably does not exist anywhere in the world as we know
it, and even assuming that it does exist in respect to some particular
phenomenon, it obviously is not this sort that is involved in voluntary activity. A body moving about unconsciously and without any
cause whatsoever, constantly or every once in a while changing the
direction and rate of its motion for no reason and to no purpose,
and having nothing to say about anything pertaining to its migrations, would exhibit an example of a causeless phenomenon.
A
freeman does not resemble such a stupid errant body, he would
hate the purposeless freedom it possesses, and his voluntary acts,
being conscious, desired, examined by his own judgment, and directed toward definite aims, are entirely dififerent from its aimless
peregrinations.
If

the

libertarian

means

man's reasoning faculty

is

that

in

advising particular choices

not guided by causal necessities, but

is
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merely telling the freeman that he must act thus and so without pointing out to him the inexorable consequences \yhich, owing to causality, will

probably or certainly follow his actions, the claim

an agency

cojitradictory, because

By

be a reasoning entity.

must make use of

logical

in that certain acts will

its

acting in this

self-

is

manner would not

very definition the reasoning faculty

arguments whose very essence consists

serve as inexorable causes of certain pleas-

ant or impleasant, moral or immoral, consequences, thus creating

strong desires for obtaining or avoiding the

means

libcrtarianism

If

that

man

latter.

possesses an entity called

vital, which produces impulses
no causes or have causes incomprehensible to our inand delivers categorical imperatives without regard to our

or what Bergson calls elan

will,

that have
tellect,

reasoning faculty, the claim is again contrary to facts, since, as was
shown above, the causes of our desires or impulses usually are
well known and are subjected to the judgment of our reason before
they are allowed to serve as motives for voluntary acts.

such an entity, even

would have
causa

if

it

were guided

b}''

Moreover,

some mysterious

causes,

to be placed at the beginning of causal series as

But

finalis.

it

Avas already pointed out that the

of the existence of final causes does

n.ot

a

assumption

violate the doctrine of

man' possessed such an irraiional entity,
only the insane, the stupid, and little children would obey its despotic and unexplained commands the sane and educated freeman.
determinism.

Finally,

if

;

who loves his independence and prides himself on the possession
of much intelligence, would certainly consult and obey his reasoning
faculty before committing a voluntary act. The voice of the irrational entity

would therefore be a cry

in the wilderness

without any

influence on the voluntary activity of the intelligent freeman.

libcrtarianism

is

Hence

either identical with determinism, merely applying

phase of voluntary activity which makes it possible for the
freeman to follow his own strongest desires and best arguments,
or is a false theory that should be discarded.

to that

We

shall

now

attack the problem of moral responsibility.

In

addition to implying sormdness of mind, the term, moral responsibility is usually

given two meanings: (1) that of accountability for

harm one has already
in the future.

From

done, and (2) that of obligation to do no
a practical point of view, the second

is

harm
much

more important than the first, since it is much more important to
prevent future harm than merely to find out why harm was done.
The libertarian holds sane people responsible for their acts in both
of the above senses, while the determinist holds them responsible
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only in the second meaning of the term.

The former assumes

that

they could have acted otherwise than they did, while the latter
asserts that the fact that they

have acted

proves, that, taking into consideration

in a particular

manner

the factors which have

all

influenced their past conduct, such as heredity, conditions, personal
etc., they could not have acted otherwise.
In the
arguments of this paper, the view of the libertarian is
untenable.
But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a
criminal could have acted' differently, his treatment by the State
would be the same. When the harm of one's past act is rectifiable,
it will be rectified even if it was committed against or without one's
volition.
Stolen goods will be returned to their owners even when
one was compelled by somebody else to steal, or when they were
stolen by a somnambulist.
When the harm is irremediable, no
amount of punishment will remedy it. Revenge as justification for
punishment is nowadays considered unworthy of a moral and civi-

idiosyncrasies,

light of the

lized State.

As

to future acts,

it is

clear that

when

a past act

is

not followed

by consequences disagreeable to the actor he and others
probably repeat

it

brings dire results
desires that

will

most

when circumstances are propitious, but when it
they will create in him and others new and strong

may overcome

their desire for repeating

it

or doing

one of the two justifications the community
has for punishing crimes committed by people in a state of perfect

anything like

it.

This

is

sanity, the other being the sense of self-protection, since crimes are

detrimental to the welfare of the community.

Since the knowledge

of the certainty of punishment for misbehavior exercises a salubrious
influence on prospective criminals, creating in

them strong

desires

for staying on the path of righteousness, punishment for crimes
.

must be

inflicted in

order to prove this certainty, though

that a past act could not

have been avoided.

doctrine of determinism deprives the State of

punishing criminals

is

The
all

we know

claim that the
justification of

therefore erroneous.

Equally erroneous are the other claims of the fourth argument.

The

claim that determinism deprives moral obligation of

cance

is

its signifi-

without foundation because the moral person feels the

demands of

his moral sense, and he
most cases which acts are moral
and which immoral. Admitting this, he thereby admits his responsibility for whatever he intends to do, and actually tries to be moral.
This is all we can expect him to do, and this is all we want by
holding him responsible, and as long as he does try to be moral,

necessity of satisfying the

also feels his ability to decide in
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he feels himself and others consider him responsible for his present

and future conduct. When, however, an act has past out of his
control by having been carried away into the past by the irreversible flow of time, no one can claim that he could have acted otherwise, though, as said above, he must be punished for having acted
immorally. Responsibility and punishment are therefore perfectly
compatible with the doctrine of determinism.

Remorse for

the committal of wrong acts is felt only by the
and even he soon comes to see the utter uselessness of crying over spilt milk. With the moral determinist remorse
is a feeling of sincere regret for a deplorable though unavoidable
past occurrence, and with him, too, the feeling is the deeper the
Since the attention of
greater the harm resulting from the act.
most people is concentrated chiefly on the present and the future,
since they feel the freedom of acting according to their own desires
and judgments, and since they are not philosophers analyzing the
forces underlying and determining their activity, the doctrine of
determinism is either unknown or does not appeal to them. Believing that they could have changed their actions, they readily

moral

fall

libertarian,

prey to the feeling of remorse.

conduct

is

In so far as influencing future

concerned, the regret of the determinist

is

as efficacious

as the remorse of the libertarian.

As

improvement of man's moral character, the State has
instructing the young citizen in the principles of
ethics, thus developing and strengthening his moral sense, in addition to frequently drawing his attention to the fact that, even from
a purely practical point of view, moral conduct is preferable to
to the

the ability of

immoral, because, as a

rule,

wrong doing brings woe,

ostracism,

and punishment to the wrong-doer. The State has therefore the
power to mould the character of the citizen to a considerable extent,
to create in him strong desires for moral behavior, thus contributing
to making a moral man of a young person who, left to himself,
might grow up to be a scoundrel. The doctrine of determinism
does not prevent the State from doing so, since the acts are yet to
be performed, and can therefore be influenced. Determinism merely
claims that when the State does so it is forced by a sense of duty
to its citizens.
Sound moral education, punishment for, and public
disapproval of, immorality have in the past contributed to the evolution of moral man from the amoral savage, and the application
of these factors in the future will contribute to the further progress

of our race along ethical

lines.

